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ABSTRACT 
Developed by Paul Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, and Benjamin Jun 
in 1999, Differential Power Analysis (DPA) represents a 
unique and powerful cryptanalysis technique. Insight into 
the encryption and decryption behavior of a cryptographic 
device can be determined by examining its electrical power 
signature. This paper describes a novel approach for 
implementation of the AES algorithm which provides a 
significantly improved strength against differential power 
analysis with a minimal additional hardware overhead. Our 
method is based on randomization in composite field 
arithmetic which entails an area penalty of only 7% while 
does not decrease the working frequency, does not alter the 
algorithm and keeps perfect compatibility with the 
published standard. The efficiency of the proposed 
technique was verified by practical results obtained from 
real implementation on a Xilinx Spartan-II FPGA. 
Keywords 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Algorithm, 
Differential Power Analysis, FPGA Implementation, 
Countermeasure, Composite Field Arithmetic. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the first publication of Kocher et al. [1] titled 
"Differential Power Analysis", many power analysis 
attacks have been developed. Power analysis attacks exploit 
the dependence between the instantaneous power 
consumption of a cryptographic device and the data it 
processes and/or the operation it performs. This type of 
attacks is known as a powerful technique for revealing 
confidential data (e.g. a secret key of a cryptographic 
algorithm) because it is imperceptible to users and it does 
not require expensive equipments like the micro probing 
techniques [2, 3]. The Differential Power Analysis (DPA) 
is a statistical test which examines a large number of power 
consumption signals to retrieve secret keys. The DPA is 
multiform itself. It can be performed by analyzing the 
intermediate values of one bit (mono-bit DPA) or a set of 
several bits (multi-bit DPA). It can also be observed at one 
instant of time [1] (first-order DPA) or at some instants of 
time (higher-order DPA) [4]. Another form of these attacks, 
the so called Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) technique 
based on the correlation between the real power 
consumption of the device and a power consumption 
model, has been widely studied in the literature [5]. In 
recent years, the security of the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) against DPA has received considerable 
attention and there is a growing interest in efficient and 
secure realization of the AES. As a result of these attacks, 
numerous hardware and algorithmic countermeasures have 
been proposed. Unfortunately, most of these techniques are 
inefficient or costly or vulnerable to higher-order attacks 
[6]. They include randomized clocks, memory 
encryption/decryption schemes [7], power consumption 
randomization [8], and decorrelating the external power 
supply from the internal power consumed by the chip. 
Moreover, the use of different hardware logic, such as 
complementary logic, sense amplifier based logic (SABL), 
and asynchronous logic [9, 10] have been also proposed. 
Some of these techniques require about twice as much area 
and will consume twice as much power as an 
implementation that is not protected against power attacks. 
For example, the technique proposed in [10] adds area 3 
times and reduces throughput by a factor of 4. Another 
method is masking which involves ensuring the attacker 
cannot predict any full registers in the system without 
making run-specific assumptions that are independent of 
the inputs to the system. This is achieved by applying a 
reversible random mask to the plaintext data before 
encryption with a modified algorithm. This makes 
exploiting data from several encryptions impossible as it 
would require guessing the correct mask for each run. 
Unfortunately, this method is costly or inefficient even if it 
has been demonstrated that it works. The main problem 
with masking methods is that they usually require an extra 
datapath that work in parallel to compute the modification 
of the mask by the algorithm which considerably increases 
hardware overhead and decreases the throughput. Most 
importantly, some masking techniques that were proposed 
were shown to be susceptible to higher order DPA attacks. 
Even techniques that were shown to be theoretically 
provably secure were susceptible to DPA using predictions 
based on simulations and a back-annotated netlist [11]. 
In this work, we concentrate on algorithmic 
countermeasures to protect AES against power attack and 
present a novel core implementation which is very simple 
and effective with very low hardware cost. This 
countermeasure is based on mathematical properties of 
Rijndael algorithm, and retains perfect compatibility with 
the published standard. We have studied the use of 
composite field techniques and isomorphism for Galois 
Field arithmetic in the context of protection of Rijndael 
against differential power attack. In order to experimentally 
verify the effectiveness of our proposed countermeasure we 
have implemented two versions of AES, a protected and an 
unprotected, on a Xilinx Spartan-II FPGA and compared 
the results of the implementation in the terms of resistance 
against attack, speed, area and throughput. While FPGAs 
are becoming increasingly popular for cryptographic 
applications, there are only a few articles that assess their 
vulnerability to such attacks. In particular, very little work 
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has been done on the resistance of FPGAs to hardware or 
system attacks, which, in practice, pose far a greater danger 
than algorithmic attacks. The results we obtained in this 
work are very encouraging compared with the results 
reported in the literature. The area overhead is only 7% 
with no decrease in speed or clock frequency or alteration 
in the algorithm. In addition, our technique directed at both 
hardware and software realizations and could be easily used 
in variety of platforms such as FPGAs, smart cards, DSPs 
or other security tokens. Most importantly, this work shows 
that it is possible to design algorithms to be inherently 
impervious to DPA. This article is organized as follows: 
The AES algorithm will be briefly discussed in section II. 
The principle of DPA attack will be reviewed in section III. 
The proposed approach will be illustrated in section VI. 
Section V explains the measurement setup used for the 
implementation of the attack and the results obtained. 
Finally, we summarize the results of our work in the 
conclusions. 
 
2. THE AES ALGORITHM  
AES has been developed and published by Daemen and 
Rijmen [12]. This algorithm is a byte-oriented symmetric 
block cipher, composed of a sequence of four primitive 
functions, Sub Bytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and 
AddRoundKey, executed round by round. Prior to each 
round AddRoundKey which combines the input with the 
cipher key is executed. In a 128-bit operation mode, at the 
start of the encryption, the message is divided to the blocks 
of length 128-bit and is copied to a 16 byte rectangular 
array called State. AddRoundKey is only a simple bit-wise 
XOR operation in which the elements of the State are 
XORed with RoundKey bit-by-bit. Sub Bytes is a non-
linear bit-wise substitution of all bytes in the State. In Sub 
Bytes, each byte in the State is replaced by its 
corresponding byte in another table called S-Box. S-Box 
contains multiplicative inverse of all possible bytes over 
GF(28) followed by an affine transformation. Each byte is 
an element of Galois field GF(28) with irreducible 
polynomial m(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1. In the ShiftRows 
transformation, each row of the state is considered 
separately and the bytes in that row are cyclically shifted to 
the left based upon the key-size of the algorithm. For the 
128-bit key, the first row is unchanged. However, the 
second, third and fourth rows are shifted one, two, and 
three bytes respectively. The MixColumns transformation 
is a bricklayer permutation operating on each column of the 
State. In MixColumns, columns of the State are considered 
as a four-term polynomial over GF(28), then are multiplied 
with a fixed polynomial  
c(x) = {03}x3 + {01}x2 + {01}x + {02}. Multiplications are 
performed modulo (x4+1). The algorithm for the decryption 
has the same structure but uses mathematical inverses of 
the encryption steps, i.e. InvSubBytes, InvShiftRows, and 
InvMixColumns. The round keys are the same as those in 
encryption but are used in reverse order. Figure 1 shows the 
standard implementation of the AES. 
 
Figure 1.Standard implementation of the AES 
algorithm. 
 
3. DPA AGAINST AES 
In DPA, an attacker uses a so-called hypothetical model of 
the attacked device. The model is used to predict several 
values for the side-channel output of a device. This 
hypothetical model for the AES is one AddRoundKey and 
the SBox lookup of the first round which is fed with the 
plaintexts and one byte of the first subkey. The output of 
SubBytes is usually attacked in practice since that is the 
only function in AES in which data and cipher key enter a 
direct operation. These predictions are compared to the 
real, measured side-channel output of the device. 
Comparisons are performed by applying statistical methods 
on the data. Among others, the most popular are the 
distance-of-mean test and the correlation analysis. For the 
correlation analysis, the model predicts the amount of side-
channel leakage for a certain moment of time in the 
execution. These predictions are correlated to the real side-
channel output. This correlation can be measured using the 
Pearson correlation coefficient. Let ti denotes the ith 
measurement data (i.e. the ith trace) and T the set of traces. 
Let pi denote the prediction of the model for the ith trace 
and P the set of such predictions [13]. Then we calculate: 
 
   ܥሺܶ, ܲሻ ൌ  ܧሺܶ. ܲሻ െ  ܧሺܶሻܧሺܲሻඥܸܽݎሺܶሻ. ܸܽݎሺܲሻ             ሺ1ሻ 
 
Here E(T) denotes the expectation (average) trace of the set 
of traces T and Var (T) denotes the variance of a set of 
traces T. In practice it is not possible to know the true 
values for the covariance or standard deviation of variables, 
only calculate approximations of them based on the values 
discovered through experiments. If this correlation is high, 
it is usually assumed that the prediction of the model, and 
thus the key hypothesis, is correct. The scenario of DPA 
attack based-on distance-of-mean test is as follows. At first 
N plaintexts are randomly generated. Power consumption 
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measures are taken for each plaintext. As before, a 
hypothetical model of the AES is fed with the plaintexts 
and one byte of the first subkey. Only the SBox of the first 
round is targeted by the attacker since that is the only 
function in AES in which data and cipher key enter a direct 
operation (See Figure 1). To this output hypothesis, a 
selection function D is applied. This selection function 
divides the measures in two sets. One where the selection 
function returns one and the other for the return zero. For 
each set the average is computed. Then, the difference 
between the two averages is calculated. This leads to 28 
differential curves. Only for the correct subkey the 
selection function has worked properly and there will be 
well seen spikes in an otherwise flat curve [1]. High-order 
DPA uses more general DPA selection functions to perform 
differential power analysis. High-order attacks require 
using multiple samples in a single power trace to compute a 
DPA power trace value. Using multiple samples is 
analogous to second order or higher digital signal 
processing with memory. An attacker can mount a second 
order attack by computing joint statistics on power 
signatures at different sections on the encryption code. One 
drawback to high-order DPA is increased memory and 
processor requirements because of the need to store 
multiple samples for a single DPA computation. The 
required trace equipment for high-order DPA is identical to 
the trace equipment required for SPA and DPA, but more 
sophisticated post-processing requires additional off-line 
resources. Knowledge of the encryption algorithm and 
specific implementation is more critical in high-order DPA 
than first-order. Attackers need to know specific points of 
execution where joint statistics can be meaningfully 
computed. 
 
 
Figure 1. Partial power trace of an AES encryption. 
 
4. AES AND COMPOSITE FIELD 
ARITHMETIC 
 
The SubBytes and the InvSubBytes in the AES algorithm 
are traditionally implemented by look-up tables (LUT). 
Non-LUT-based approaches, which employ combinational 
logic only, such as the composite field (or tower field) 
inversion over GF(28) are used to avoid the unbreakable 
delay of LUTs, and it can be used to create compact AES 
implementations [13]. Composite field arithmetic can be 
employed, such that the field elements of GF(28) are 
mapped to elements in some isomorphic composite fields, 
in which the field operations can be implemented by lower 
cost subfield operations. The two pairs {GF(2n), Q(y)} and 
{GF(2n)m), P(x)} constitute a composite field if GF(2n) is 
constructed from GF(2) by Q(y) and GF((2n)m) is 
constructed from GF(2n) by P(x), where Q(y) and p(x) are 
polynomials of degree n and m respectively. The fields 
GF(2n)m) and GF(2k), k = nm, are isomorphic to each other.  
The most costly operation in the SubBytes is the 
multiplicative inversion over a field A (the AES field), 
where A is extended from GF(2) with the irreducible 
polynomial m(x) mentioned in Section II. To reduce the 
cost of this operation, the following 3-stage method is 
adopted: 
(Stage 1) Map all elements of the field A to a composite 
field B, using an isomorphism function δ. 
(Stage 2) Compute the multiplicative inverses over the field 
B. 
(Stage 3) Re-map the computation results to A, using the 
function δ–1. Figure 2 shows the outline of an S-Box 
implementation using the composite field technique. 
 
Figure 2. Computation sequences of composite-field 
based SBox. 
 
To reduce the cost of Stage 2 as much as possible, it is 
known to be efficient to construct the composite field B 
using repeated degree-2 extensions under a polynomial 
basis using these irreducible polynomials [13], 
 
ቐ
ܩܨሺ2ଶሻ            ՜   ଴ܲሺݔሻ ൌ ݔଶ ൅ ݔ ൅ 1
ܩܨ൫ሺሺ2ଶሻଶሻ൯   ՜ ଵܲሺݔሻ ൌ  ݔଶ ൅ ݔ ൅ Ԅ
ܩܨሺሺሺ2ଶሻଶሻଶሻ ՜ ଶܲሺݔሻ ൌ ݔଶ ൅ ݔ ൅ λ
         ሺ2ሻ 
 
Where Ф = {10}2, λ = {1100}2. The isomorphism functions δ and δ-1 in Stages 1 and 3 are constructed as follows. The δ 
(and δ-1) can be found as follows. 
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ߜ ൌ   
ۏ
ێێ
ێێ
ێێ
ۍ1 0 11 1 0
1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1
1 1 01
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 01
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1ے
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ې
 
 
ߜିଵ ൌ  
ۏ
ێێ
ێێ
ێێ
ۍ1 1 10 1 0
0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1
0 0 11
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1ے
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ې
 
 
Let q be the element in GF(28), then the isomorphic mappings 
and its inverse can be written as δ*q and δ-1*q, which is a case 
of matrix multiplication as shown below, where q7 is the most 
significant bit and q0 is the least significant bit. The matrix 
multiplication can be translated to logical XOR operation as is 
shown below.  
 
ߜ ൈ ݍ ൌ  
ۏ
ێێ
ێێ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ ݍ଻  ْ  ݍହݍ଻  ْ ݍ଺ ْ ݍସ ْ ݍଷ ْ ݍଶ ْ ݍଵ
ݍ଻  ْ ݍହ ْ ݍଷ ْ ݍଶ
ݍ଻  ْ ݍହ ْ ݍଷ ْ ݍଶ ْ ݍଵ
ݍ଻  ْ ݍ଺ ْ ݍଶ ْ ݍଵ
ݍ଻  ْ ݍସ ْ ݍଷ ْ ݍଶ ْ ݍଵ
ݍ଺ ْ ݍସ ْ ݍଵ
ݍ଺ ْ ݍଵ ْ ݍ଴ ے
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
 
ߜିଵ ൈ ݍ ൌ  
ۏ
ێێ
ێێ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ ݍ଻  ْ ݍ଺ ْ ݍହ ْ ݍଵ ݍ଺ ْ ݍଶ
ݍ଺  ْ ݍହ ْ ݍଵ
ݍ଺  ْ ݍହ ْ ݍସ ْ ݍଶ ْ ݍଵ
ݍହ  ْ ݍସ ْ ݍଷ ْ ݍଶ ْ ݍଵ
ݍ଻  ْ ݍସ ْ ݍଷ ْ ݍଶ ْ ݍଵ
ݍହ ْ ݍସ
ݍ଺  ْ ݍହ ْ ݍସ ْ ݍଶ ْ ݍ଴ے
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
 
Thus, the multiplicative inversion in GF(28) can be carried out 
in GF((24)2) by the architecture illustrated in Figure 3.  
The multipliers in GF(24) can be further decomposed into 
multipliers in GF(22) and then to GF(2), in which a 
multiplication is simply an AND operation. Figure 3 
illustrates this decomposition, together with the other blocks 
used in Figure 4 except the inversion in GF(24) block.  
 
 
Figure 3. Implementation of SubBytes Transformation using composite field arithmetic. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Implementation of individual blocks, (a) multiplier in GF(24), (b) multiplier in GF(22), (c) squarer in GF(24),  
(d) constant multiplier (×λ); and (e) multiplier(×Ф). 
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3.1 Composite Field Arithmetic Operations 
 
Any arbitrary polynomial can be represented by bx + c where 
b is upper half term and c is the lower half term. Therefore, 
from here, a binary number in Galois Field q can be spilt to  
qH x + qL. For instance, if q = {1011}2, it can be represented as 
{10}2x + {11}2, where qH is {10}2 and qL = {11}2. qH and qL 
can be further decomposed to {1}2x + {0}2 and {1}2x + {1}2 
respectively. The decomposing is done by making use of the 
irreducible polynomials introduced at (2). Using this idea, the 
logical equations for the addition, squaring, multiplication and 
inversion which were shown in Figure 4 can be derived. 
Detailed explanation of the implementation of all these blocks 
is out of the scope of this article. However, to clarify the 
subject to the readers to better understand how these modules 
can be implemented using combinational logic, the realization 
of constant multipliers (×λ) and (×φ) is briefly illustrated [14]. 
For the purpose of practicality, the depth of the mathematics 
involved has been reduced in order to allow the reader to 
better figure out the internal operations within the S-Box. 
 
Let k = qλ, where k = {k3 k2 k1 k0}2, q = {q3 q2 q1 q0}2 and  λ = {1100}2 are elements of GF(24). 
 
݇ ൌ ሼ݇ଷ݇ଶ݇ଵ݇଴ሽ ൌ ݇ுݔ ൅ ݇௅ ൌ   ሼݍଷݍଶݍଵݍ଴ሽሺ1100ሻ 
Where ߣு ൌ ሼ11}2 and ߣ௅ ൌ   ሼ00ሽଶ 
 
݇ ൌ ሺݍுݔ ൅ ݍ௟ሻሺߣுݔ ൅ ߣ௟ሻ ߣ௟ can be canceled out since ߣ௟ ൌ   ሼ00ሽଶ ݇ = qH ߣு x2 + ql ߣு x 
 
Modulo reduction can be performed by substituting x2 = x + φ 
using the irreducible polynomial in (2) to yield the expression 
below. 
 
݇ = qH ߣு(x+ φ) + qL ߣுx ݇ = (qH ߣு ൅ ql ߣுሻݔ ൅ ሺqH ߣுሻ φ א GF(22) 
 
kH and kL terms can be further broken down to GF(2). 
 
݇H = qH ߣு+ qL ߣு ݇H = (q3q2)(112) + (q1q0)(112) 
݇H = (q3x+q2)(x+1)+(q1x+q0)(x+1) 
݇H =q3x2+(q3+q2)x+q2+q1x2+(q1+q0)x+q0                        (3) 
 
Substituting x2 = x + 1, would then yield the following. 
 
݇H = q3(x+1) + (q3+q2)x + q2+q1(x+1)+(q1+q0)x+q0 
݇H = (q3+q3+q2+q1+q1+q0)x+(q3+q2+q1+q0) 
݇3x+݇2 = (q2+q0)x + (q3+q2+q1+q0) א GF(2) 
 
The same procedure is taken to decompose ݇Lto GF(2). 
 
kL = qH ߣு߮  
kL = (q3q2)(112)(102) 
kL = (q3x+q2)(x+1)x 
kL =q3x3+q2x2+q1x+q0 
 
Again, the x2 term can be substituted since x2 = x + 1. 
Likewise, x3 is also substituted with x3 = 1. So, we have: 
 
kL =q3(1)+q2(x+1)+ q3(x+1)+q2x 
kL =(q3+q2+q1)x+(q3+q2+q1) 
݇1x+݇0 =(q3)x + (q2) א GF(2)                                  (4) 
From equations (3), (4) combined, the formula for computing 
multiplication with constant λ is shown below.  
 
݇ଷ ൌ  ݍଶ ْ ݍ଴ ݇ଶ ൌ  ݍଷ ْ ݍଶ ْ ݍଵ ْ ݍ଴ ݇ଵ ൌ  ݍଷ ݇଴ ൌ  ݍଶ                                                                            (5) 
 
From the equation (5) the architecture for multiplication with 
constant λ can be depicted as below  
(Ф = {10}2, λ = {1100}2). 
 
 
Figure 5. Hardware diagram for multiplication with constant λ  
(λ = 12) 
 
The same method could be used for multiplication with 
constant λ when λ = {1111}2. Figure 6 shows this architecture. 
Other architectures shown in figure 4 can be implemented 
simply using the same technique. As it is seen any change in  
{Ф, λ, δ, δ-1} could be easily translated to Boolean logic and 
changing the SBox architecture by using this method has a 
very low hardware cost. 
 
Figure 6. Hardware diagram for multiplication with constant λ 
(λ = 15) 
 
As another example consider multiplication with constant 
(×φ) in GF(22) where φ = {10}2. Let k = qφ where  
k ={k1k0}2, q = {q1q0}2 and φ = {10}2 are elements of 
GF(22).  
 
k = k1x + k0 = (q1q0)(102)= (q1x + q0)(x) 
k = q1x2 + q0x 
Substitute the term x2 with x+1, yield the expression 
below. 
k = q1(x+1)+q0x 
k = (q1 + q0)x + (q1) א GF(2) 
hence, the formula for computing multiplication with φ 
can be derived and is shown below. 
k1 = q1 + q0 
k0 = q1 
The hardware implementation of multiplication with  
φ = {10}2 is shown in figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7. Hardware implementation of multiplication  
with φ = {10}2. 
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The hardware implementation of the multiplication with 
φ = {11}2 can be obtained as follows. 
k = k1x + k0 = (q1q0)(112)= (q1x + q0)(x+1) 
k = q1x2 + (q0+ q1)x + q0 
Substitute the term x2 with x+1, yield the expression 
below. 
k = q0x+(q0+q1) א GF(2) 
hence, the formula for computing multiplication with  
φ = {11}2 can be derived and is shown in figure 8. 
k1 = q0 
k0 = q0+q1 
 
 
Figure 8. Hardware implementation of multiplication  
with φ = {11}2. 
 
 
3.2 PREVIOUS WORKS 
In [15] Rostovtsev and Shemyakina describe using of 
isomorphisms of the underlying finite field. But as the authors 
admit, their method has comparatively small efficiency. The 
technique proposed in [16] randomizes power consumption of 
SBox by randomly choosing irreducible generator 
polynomials of the field GF(28). The approach is interesting 
but introduces significant hardware cost with almost 300% 
increase in area and 60% decrease in speed. Another method 
based on univariate polynomials of Blomer et. al. has been 
illustrated in [17]. This can be seen as a perfectly general 
method that can be applied to any S-box, as any function over 
a finite field can be seen as a univariate polynomial. This 
makes the method more efficient than in the general case and 
suitable for Rijndael. However, it suffers from considerable 
decrease in performance. Tower Fields Methods by Oswald, 
et al. [18, 19] are designed for hardware implementations. In 
these methods, the computing of Inv in GF(22k) is reduced to a 
secure computation with masked values of multiplications and 
inverses in GF(2k), by representing GF(22k) as a quadratic 
extension of GF(2k). Multiplications can be computed with 
additive masking and we are left with the problem of a secure 
computation of Inv at the lower level. In [20] Schramm 
proposes mask multipliers for GF(22) and GF(24) which are 
used in the masked composite field-based AES SBox for 
software applications. However, this approach needs 1536 
bytes ROM to store the masked SBox and takes 13600 clock 
cycles to implement masked AES encryption while a similar 
unmasked AES realization takes 800 cycles. 
4 NEW IDEA 
In the power analysis, the key detection is possible because of 
the dependency between the power consumption of devices 
and the intermediate values of the cryptographic algorithms. 
Therefore, if we want to prevent from these kinds of attacks, 
this dependency should be broken. Considering this fact, we 
have studied the structure of SBox and based on our 
knowledge of math, the three parameters {Ф, λ, δ} are not 
constant since there could be much more than one eligible 
isomorphism (see Figures 3, 4). The polynomial  
Pଵሺxሻ ൌ   xଶ ൅ x ൅ Ԅ is an irreducible polynomial over the field 
GF(22) if and only if 1< Ф <4, and Pଶሺxሻ ൌ   xଶ ൅ x ൅ λ is 
irreducible over GF(24) if and only if  
7< λ <16. So, there are 16 different combinations for {Ԅ , λ}. 
We can also search in the set of linear transformations from 
GF(28) to itself or all autoisomorphism over GF(28) and it can 
be proved that there are ∏ ሺ2଼଻୧ୀ଴ െ 2୧ሻ of such 
transformations. So we can have the same number of different 
δ/δ-1 [21, 22] and considerable number of sets {Ф, λ, δ, δ-1} 
for Rijndael. It must be mentioned that all of the possible 
combinations of {Ф, λ, δ, δ-1} will not result in an appropriate 
field isomorphism. We have found 32 different suitable sets of 
the mentioned parameters which can be implemented with 
minimum combinational logic. For example, these three 
following sets have such characteristics. The elements of 
matrices δ and δ-1 and the values of Ф and λ are represented in 
decimal. 
 
Ф= 2, λ = 15 
δ= {160, 126, 114, 162, 182, 84, 16, 217}T 
δ-1={46, 28, 174, 2, 122, 26, 144, 75}T 
Ф= 3, λ = 12 
δ= {160, 222, 172, 174, 202, 238, 44, 227}T 
δ-1={102, 212, 230, 162, 10, 234, 176, 233}T 
Ф= 3, λ = 10 
δ= {160, 126, 172, 2, 20, 132, 130, 99}T 
δ-1= {190, 132, 62, 106, 98, 2, 112, 141}T 
 
Therefore, one can make a random isomorphism by 
generating different sets of {Ф, λ, δ, δ-1} and randomly 
choosing them in each block encryption/decryption. As 
described, two ciphers are isomorphic if they produce the 
same output for the same input. Hence, from the architectures 
shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, it is obvious that we can have 
many SBoxes with similar input/output pairs and different 
internal structures. As it was shown in section III, it is simple 
to realize and select different architectures of SBox based on 
different values of {Ф, λ, δ, δ-1} since such changes can be 
easily realized by Boolean gates only (please see figures 4-6). 
As a result, for a specific input, there will be different power 
consumption patterns while the output remains the same. 
Since different binary values are used each time, power traces 
collected for DPA will be weakly correlated to the data being 
manipulated and it will be harder to extract the secret key or 
any other sensitive information, even if many runs are 
performed for the same inputs. The proposed technique 
effectively reduces the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of the 
performed operations. As we know, the SNR quantifies how 
much information is leaking from a power trace. The most 
important features of the proposed method are that it does not 
change the mathematical properties of SBox at all, do not 
decrease the working frequency and has very low area 
overhead because any change in the architecture of Figure 3 
and Figure 4 can be easily realized by Boolean gates only.  In 
addition, it is very simple compared with those presented in 
the literature and fully complies with the published standard. 
No additional parameters than the secret key and the data to 
be processed are needed. The operation of the system is as 
follows: at first all 32 (or more) possible sets of values for  
{Ф, λ, δ, δ-1} are produced and stored. In our prototype, a 
linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is used as a 
pseudorandom number generator for proof of the concept. 
Encryptor and decryptor agree on the initial state of this LFSR 
as they agree on the cipher key. In each block 
encryption/decryption, one set is chosen by pseudorandom 
number generator and one of the 32 corresponding SBox 
architectures (as was shown in figure 4) is selected randomly. 
Please notice that multiplication by different values of  
{Ф, λ, δ} is sufficient to change the intermediate values of 
these 32 Sboxes and their other parts are common and do not 
change (e.g., squarer, multiplier in GF(22), …). This is why 
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this approach has very low hardware cost. This results in very 
low area overhead with no decrease in speed or clock 
frequency since no hardware module has been added to the 
critical path. In order to prevent any power information 
leakage when the output of SBox is stored in the output 
register, another random number generator selects two other  
δ-1 matrixes randomly and multiplies the pre-final value to 
them concurrently in a parallel path. This make power 
consumption pattern of the final stage of SBox computation 
indistinguishable for the attacker and to prevent he/she to 
mount a successful attack on this point. This concurrent 
multiplication can be easily performed in FPGA since it is one 
of the inherent advantages of FPGA. The simplicity of this 
approach makes it suitable for both hardware and software 
applications. Since the mentioned parameters could be easily 
stored inside the device, the proposed approach could be used 
in smart cards, digital signal processors or other security 
tokens.  
 
5. ATTACK ON A REAL SYSTEM 
To investigate the effect on efficiency of implementing a 
device using the new style, both regular AES and the new 
design were realized in a loop architecture in which only one 
block of data is being processed at a time, using Verilog HDL 
and were synthesized on a Xilinx Spartan-II FPGA. Both used 
128-bit keys. The encryptor core structure in regular AES 
occupied 983 CLB slices (41%), on targeting Xilinx  
Spartan-II FPGA device while this number for the modified 
implementation with 32 randomly selected SBoxs was 1050. 
This means that the total area cost for the implementation is 
almost 7%, much lower than the results reported in the 
literature so far. The clock speed in both cases was almost 
42.2 MHz. Our measurement setup, as it is shown in Figure 9, 
consists of the FPGA board, an Agilent MSO7034A sampling 
oscilloscope with a 2 GS/sec, BW = 350 MHz. The board uses 
two separate power supplies, a 3.3 V supply for I/O and a  
2.5 V supply for the core cells. Only the core power supply 
was measured. A small resistor (10 ohm) was inserted 
between the FPGA board and the power supply. In order to 
reduce switching noise and to improve the accuracy, the 
working frequency of FPGA board was lowered to 1 KHz and 
all measurements were averaged over ten times. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Experimental setup used for mounting the 
attack. 
 
In order to improve the SNR and accuracy of the attack, 
instead of considering a monobit, a set of four bit was 
considered, i.e. our selection function returns one when 
hamming weight of the output of SBox is greater than four, 
and otherwise it returns zero. It has been shown that the 
efficiency of the attack is increased in such a case since the 
ghost peaks and secondary peaks are lowered [23]. 
The experimental results for the differential power traces for 
the correct and a wrong subkey guesses are shown in Figure 
10 and Figure 11 respectively. As it is seen, the plots confirm 
the assumption about the measurability of Hamming-Weights 
leakage. We need approximately 1,000 measurements to 
identify the correct key. 
 
 
Figure 10. The differential power traces for the correct 
subkey guess in the unprotected implementation. 
 
Figure 11. The differential power traces for a wrong 
subkey guess in the unprotected implementation. 
 
The results of calculation of correlations for the first subkey 
are shown in Figure 12, in which the correct value, 0x3C, 
appears as a clear peak. Our experiments showed that 
recovering the full 128-bit key with this method takes almost 
two hours with an Intel 2.5 GHz quad processor computer. 
 
Figure 12. Recovering the correct subkey using a 
correlation attack with real measurements. 
 
The setup was repeated using an implementation of the new 
algorithm. Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the differential 
power traces for the correct and wrong key guesses in the 
protected version respectively. As it is seen the correct key 
cannot be distinguished from the wrong key as there is more 
much noise in the system. Figure 15 and Figure 16 show the 
different patterns of power traces when inputting the same 
plaintext. Figure 17 shows the correlations for each possible 
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key guess in the new implementation after 1000 traces. This 
time the correct value is completely obscured by other values 
and there are no clear peaks, just a band of random values. 
The experiment was repeated with a new key schedule, this 
time 6000 power traces were recorded. Again, the correct 
value was not distinguishable from the incorrect ones. This 
protection technique could be combined with other 
randomization techniques to make the probability of success 
of DPA as low as possible. For example, the technique 
mentioned above could be used with randomly inserting 
dummy codes and/or shuffling. As we know, the basic idea of 
shuffling is to randomly change the sequence of those 
operations of a cryptographic algorithm that can be performed 
in arbitrary order. In case of AES, sixteen SubBytes 
operations need to be performed in every round. These 
substitution operations are independent of each other. Hence, 
they can be performed in arbitrary order. Shuffling of these 
operations means that during each execution of AES, 
randomly generated numbers are used to determine the 
sequence of the sixteen SubBytes operations. Shuffling 
randomizes the power consumption in a similar way as the 
random insertion of dummy operations. However, shuffling 
does not affect the throughput as much as the random 
insertion of dummy operations. In practice, shuffling and the 
random insertion of dummy operations are often combined. It 
should be noted that we have neither performed higher-order 
power analysis in this work, nor studied the resistance of the 
new implementation against it. So, we do not claim that this 
approach can counteract the higher-order DPA. It will remain 
as our future study. 
 
 
Figure 13. The differential power traces for a correct 
subkey guess in the modified implementation. 
 
 
Figure 14. The differential power traces for a wrong 
subkey guess in the modified implementation. 
 
Figure 15. The differential power traces for a known 
plaintext in the modified implementation with a specific 
set of parameters {Ф, λ, δ, δ-1}. 
 
 
Figure 16. The differential power traces for the same 
plaintext in the modified implementation with another set 
of parameters {Ф, λ, δ, δ-1}. 
 
 
Figure 17. Result of correlation analysis for recovering the 
correct subkey in the modified implementation. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
A novel AES implementation with a simple and integrated 
countermeasure against DPA was presented. The 
countermeasure is based on mathematical properties of 
Rijndael algorithm and retains perfect compatibility with the 
published Standard. The new design permits the construction 
of actual cores with very efficient area and speed 
characteristics, while still keeping a very high protection 
level. Although certain features of FPGAs make the practical 
implementation of power attacks considerably harder than in 
the smart card context, we have conducted relevant 
experimental tests and verified our idea practically. Nearly all 
the algorithms embedded in smart cards have been designed 
to resist at high level to linear, differential and high-order 
differential attacks, whereas nothing has been done to make 
them inherently resistant to DPA attacks. However, this work 
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demonstrated that like with other attacks it is possible to 
design algorithms to be impervious to DPA, so when the next 
generation of cryptographic algorithms is designed they may 
be inherently secure against these attacks.  
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